

DCI/ICS 84-3701
9 January 1984

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director, Intelligence Community Staff

FROM: [redacted]
Vice Chairman, Critical Intelligence Problems Committee

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SUBJECT: Terrorism

1. In regard to the meeting this afternoon at 1530, we have invited [redacted]
[redacted] of CIA and [redacted] of NSA. [redacted] is bringing [redacted]
[redacted] a communications networking expert.

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2. I have prepared a concept paper to form the basis for discussion
(Attachment 1). It describes the formation of what could be called the "DCI
Terrorism Analyst Network."

3. I have asked [redacted] to attend the meeting and to speak briefly
about the Long Commission Report and the background and intent of the
recommendation concerning establishing a Fusion Center to support field
commanders.

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4. It appears that news of this afternoon's meeting has spread. You may
receive calls (at least from Navy) requesting an invitation.

5. We have also prepared some questions relative to the general subject
of "fusion centers" which are at Attachment 2.

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Attachments: As stated

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ATTACHMENT 1

CONCEPT PAPER: TERRORISM

BACKGROUND

Referring to the US Commander in Beirut, the Long Commission concludes that he was not provided with the timely intelligence, tailored to his specific operational needs, that was necessary to defend against the broad spectrum of threats he faced.

In order to improve intelligence support to commanders involved in military operations in areas of high threat, conflict or crisis, the Commission recommended that SECDEF establish an all-source fusion center which would tailor and focus all-source intelligence support.

We understand that the Commission intended that the functions performed by such a center not be limited to terrorism alone but include all forms of intelligence support.

DISCUSSION

A number of "fusion center" proposals have surfaced over the past few weeks. As part of the on-going CIPC review of the Community's terrorism support posture, NSA has been requested to prepare a paper describing how a fusion center devoted only to the subject of terrorism might look and what

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functions it might perform. Meanwhile, DIA is reportedly considering the broader subject of all-source intelligence support to deployed commanders.

An important consideration with respect to the establishment of any new center--whether devoted only to terrorism or to all-source intelligence support--is that it will probably take some time and considerable effort to accomplish.

SHORT-TERM APPROACH

In order to move rapidly and specifically to improve the Community's ability to provide timely support on the subject of terrorism, there is one action that could be taken almost immediately; and that is the linking electronically of terrorism analysts at key points within the Intelligence Community.

Some key features of such an approach are:

- A designated terrorism specialist on duty 24-hours a day, seven days a week at CIA, DIA, NSA, the Services, FBI, and State.
- A dedicated communications network linking these individuals.
- An ability through the designated representatives to access information contained in existing terrorism data bases and to generate intelligence collection requests/recommendations.

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The mission of this entity, which might be called the DCI Terrorism Analyst Network, would be to exchange terrorism-related intelligence and analyze that intelligence with the objective of rapidly reporting alert information to designated customers using the most expeditious communications means available. CIA would act as the lead agency in coordinating alert reports though they could be proposed by any member of the network. Any reporting performed by the network would not replace existing reporting mechanisms and procedures but would supplement them.

An arrangement such as this has a number of significant advantages. In particular:

- It could be put in place quickly with minimal cost in terms of both dollars and personnel.
- The experience gained from operation of the network for a reasonable period of time (say, six months) could form the basis for informed judgements as to whether a single fully-manned center devoted solely to terrorism is actually required.
- It would not only provide timely terrorism alert information direct to the affected customer, but it would also service any all-source intelligence center that SECDEF may decide to establish in Washington to support deployed commanders.

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ATTACHMENT 2

Questions Regarding "Fusion Center" Proposal

MISSION: Is the Center to be targetted exclusively on terrorism? If not, what will be the bounds of its mission? How will that differ from the missions of the Community's existing set of alert centers?

LOCATION: Is the Center to be centrally "co-located" or is it to be "distributed," i.e., with nodes located at various Community elements tied together by electronic communications?

MEMBERSHIP: What elements would participate? CIA, NSA, DIA, State? What about FBI? Services? U&S Commands? Coast Guard? DEA? Commerce? DoE? Treasury? Would participation vary with the problem at hand?

MANAGEMENT: Would a single agency be in charge? Would it have "command" or simply "coordination" responsibility? Would leadership shift with the particular issue in question, e.g., CIA would manage terrorism incidents and DIA would manage warning of military attack?

STAFFING: How many personnel are needed? What skills must they have? Is this to be a 24-hour operation? (Five personnel would be required to provide 24-hour coverage for each billet in question.) Where will these personnel come from?

COMMUNICATIONS: If Fusion Center is to be "distributed," what communications are required to wire it together? Secure voice? Facsimile? Data link? Video? Is it technologically feasible? Who would pay? Can we piggyback on the Crisis Management Facility being developed by the White House?

INFORMATION BASE: Is the Center intended to have full access to all germane information, e.g., DO reporting? How would security of information be assured under these circumstances?

COLLECTION TASKING: Would the Center have any special authority with respect to collection or exploitation tasking?

PRODUCT: Would the Center's product replace or merely add to the existing set of intelligence products? How would dissent be handled?

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